One of the vital aspects of organizing global society has been individual liberty. With the introduction of the Internet, traditional notions of liberty are challenged. The global reach of information transfer requires examining liberty in its new form-"cyberliberty." Cyberliberty expands across all borders, affects all nations, and as of yet, has not been defined by any nation. This note recommends a definition of cyberliberty in order to provide a legal foundation for regulating conduct on the Internet. The definition is predicated upon freedom from the control and influence of states through their assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction, a liberty that has always been an essential element of sovereignty. 8 Part I briefly describes how traditional international law principles of prescriptive jurisdiction have been applied to activities on the Internet. It then identifies some limits to these methods that arise from the unique characteristics of the Internet. Part II surveys philosophic conceptions of liberty, recognizing the implications of liberty on the Internet, and recommends a definition of cyberliberty that favors expansive liberty and clear expectations for Internet actors.
I. Prescriptive Jurisdiction over Internet Activity
Despite the unique quality of the Internet as a key agent of globalization, and some scholarly arguments that the Internet should not be regulated under traditional standards, 9 jurisdiction over Internet-related activity is still generally tested under international jurisdictional law. 10 Jurisdiction exists in three forms:
7. Id. at 191; Henry H. Perritt, Jr., argues that "the Internet and other forces of globalization are eroding traditional institutions of sovereignty." Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Law and the Information Superhighway § 14.18 (2000) . He points out that some criticism of the Internet as a positive force of globalization does exist and avoids the criticism of wearing "rose colored glasses" when discussing globalization and the Internet. Id jurisdiction to prescribe, to adjudicate, and to enforce. 11 The primary jurisdictional problem that arises in relation to the Internet as a platform of globalization is one of prescriptive jurisdiction. It is the application of a single state's laws to Internet content that gives rise to complication. For example, may State A prohibit citizens of State B, located in State B, from posting advertisements for purple farm tractors on the Internet simply because State A prohibits the sale of purple farm tractors? Questions of this sort have strong implications for the global character of the Internet.
A firm basis for jurisdiction to prescribe is required to justify the infringement of sovereignty that would accompany regulation of Internet content. As stated in the Permanent Court of International Justice's opinion in the Lotus case, "a state . . . may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another state," and jurisdiction "cannot be exercised by a state outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention." 12 As the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York has noted, The Internet is a worldwide phenomenon, accessible from every corner of the globe. [A defendant] cannot be prohibited from operating its Internet site merely because the site is accessible from within one country in which its product is banned. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to a declaration that this Court and every other court throughout the world, may assert jurisdiction over all information providers on the global World Wide Web. 13 
A. Traditional Bases for Prescriptive Jurisdiction
International law recognizes five sources of prescriptive jurisdiction: the nationality principle, the subjective territoriality principle, the objective territoriality 12. Lotus, supra note 8, at 18-19. The Lotus case elucidates many of the foundations for international jurisdiction that are now recognized as general principles of international law.
13 principle, the protective principle, and the universal jurisdiction principle.
14 Only the nationality principle and the two territoriality principles can be, or have been, applied to the regulation of Internet information transfers. 15 
The Nationality Principle
The nationality principle has been described as supporting the jurisdiction of a nation to prescribe law "with respect to . . . the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory."
16 This principle is based on the assumption that a person grants the country of which he is a national the right to regulate his conduct, no matter where located.
17 This principle is uncontroversial in international law. 18 
The Subjective Territoriality Principle
Often referred to as the subjective territoriality doctrine, the ability of sovereign states to exercise jurisdiction over property, persons, acts or occurrences within their own territory is a fundamental principle of international law. 19 The Peace of Westphalia strengthened the notion of sovereignty of the nation state and specifically, the state right of territorial integrity. 20 
The Objective Territoriality Principle
In recent years, the principle of jurisdiction based on territoriality has been expanded beyond the traditional bounds of the subjective territoriality doctrine. Under the objective territoriality principle, the territorial basis of jurisdiction has in some cases been expanded to encompass actions that, although not occurring within a state's territory, have actual or intended effects within that state's territory. 25 It is generally recognized that the action must have a sufficiently strong link to the state's territory in order to justify jurisdiction. 26 In addition, the effect must be "direct, foreseeable, and substantial" within the territory.
27
Even if the effect of the action is "direct, foreseeable, and substantial," the objective territoriality principle is limited to uses that do not violate the notion of 21 sovereignty protected by international law. 28 In general, a state is subject to limitations on its authority to exercise jurisdiction in cases that involve foreign interests or activities.
29 "The scope of a state's sovereignty is, therefore limited and defined by the reaches of another state's sovereignty."
30 It has been suggested that every state has an obligation to exercise moderation and restraint in cases regarding a foreign element in order to avoid undue encroachment on jurisdiction of other states. 31 Jurisdiction under the objective territoriality principle may only be found when the claiming state does not act "in a manner which is contrary to the laws or national interests" of other states.
32
As some commentators have noted, the "effects" doctrine as applied by the United States has been rejected by United Kingdom, Australia, and other countries. These countries often adopt local legislation to counter the assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction on this basis. Nonetheless, some of these countries have implicitly accepted the doctrine in such cases as Wood Pulp. In Wood Pulp, the European Commission successfully filed anti-competition suits against several U.S., Canadian, and European wood product producers that had formed a cartel outside the European Union, but whose strategies were implemented there. 
A Possible Alternative: The Internet as Its Own Territory
One important alternative to current prescriptive jurisdictional schemes is to consider the Internet as a territory unto itself. This approach attempts to obviate the problem of states infringing on the sovereignty of each other by divorcing the Internet from national laws, and instead applying a separate body of law (or no law) particularly appropriate to the Internet. David R. Johnson and David G. Post, noted proponents of the Internet as a unique territory, once stated, Many of the jurisdictional and substantive quandaries raised by border-crossing electronic communications could be resolved by 28 Internet theorists such as Johnson and Post (and perhaps the majority of Internet users), saw the Internet in its early "romantic era" as a world unto itself. 35 The "romantic era" embraced the vision of the Internet as a realm where humans live, not in physical form, but rather in virtual form. Further, in cyberspace, people would have experiences just as they would in any physical territory. 36 The far-reaching nature of the Internet enables people to discover new things, meet new people, form relationships, engage in activities and discussion, and, although it is a stretch of imagination, engage in physical activities as a virtual person through role-playing or other video games. These people "meet, talk, and live in cyberspace in ways not possible in real space."
37
The primary difference between this virtual territory and any other territory is the intangible nature of the Internet. 38 It does not exist in any one territory, nation, or state. Some would argue that it exists in every state, advancing the argument that, by existing in all states, the Internet maintains such a large territory that a "neoterritory" is formed, whose governance requires a unique set of rules. In essence, cyberspace should have its own "cyberlaw."
39 As Yaman Akdeniz stated, "The Internet is a complex, anarchic, and multi-national 39. Lessig agrees that a separate law might solve some of the jurisdictional problems, but is skeptical of Johnson and Post's romantic notions of a picturesque cyberspace. Furthermore, he believes that software code (e.g., passwords and encryption to prevent trespass or copyright infringement) would be a more efficient way of regulating the Internet than a form of "cyberlaw." See Lessig, supra note 9, at 1407. environment where old concepts of regulation, reliant as they are upon tangibility in time and space, may not be easily applicable or enforceable." 40 While thinking of the Internet as a unique and independent territory deserving of its own laws and free from the laws of nations would solve many jurisdictional problems, this idea suffers two flaws. First, the Internet is not in fact independent. The intangible Internet requires the tangible. The Internet cannot exist without the human element. Somewhere someone is physically writing the code necessary for the Internet to operate. The Internet is not in fact some ethereal body beyond the physical. As it is part of the physical realm, it must have a physical location, however difficult this may be to place. Thus, the idea of the Internet as a unique and independent territory on some separate territorial plane is false.
Second, nations have already passed laws regulating the Internet, 41 demonstrating their rejection of the notion that the Internet and cyberspace are beyond the grasp of governmental powers. The United States has enacted the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, and attempted to adopt two Children's Decency Acts.
42 Germany has enacted the German Information and Communications Services Act. 43 France has attempted to apply general censorship laws to the Internet as well. The actions of these influential nations will likely attract the notice of other nations that will also create Internet-related legislation.
In the end, the analysis of the Internet as its own territory fails to solve the regulatory problem. The Internet is not a separate and individual territory. In recognition of this, states and courts have already sought to analyze Internet regulation using traditional theories of prescriptive jurisdiction. 
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B. Problems with assertion of Prescriptive Jurisdiction over Internet Activity
Two primary problems arise in the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction over the Internet. First, what location is relevant under the subjective territoriality principle? Second, how does the element of intent for jurisdiction under the objective territoriality principle apply to passive websites? This section will first present these two issues generally and then use several cases to illustrate the specific harms that can result.
The Locus Problem: Determining Location for Subjective Territoriality Jurisdiction
As discussed earlier, states have always relied on the ability to exercise jurisdiction over property, persons, acts or occurrences within their sovereign borders. 44 The fundamental complexity of applying the subjective territory principle to the Internet can be summarized in one seemingly simple question: in which territory is the Internet action in question located? Jane Ginsburg suggests that proliferation of information on the Internet nearly equates to a "simultaneous publication . . . in every country of the world in which there is Internet access."
45 As she points out, then, there are many answers to this question.
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One approach to the problem would be to consider the location of the Internet viewer as the location for purposes of subjective territoriality. 47 For a nation concerned with what is being shown or purchased through the Internet, this seems to be the logical solution. The action of viewing or purchasing occurs within its territory and therefore the nation must have a right to regulate. While initially this solution appears to be consistent with the notion of sovereignty, in fact, it is not. This approach to jurisdiction would fall within the "simultaneous publication" dilemma. For example, one nation's censorship of materials on the Internet might clash with the legal viewing and dissemination of the same materials in another country. Therefore, basing jurisdiction on the location of the Internet viewer is an incomplete approach. is not yet available to the public until it arrives at its palace of residence on the website that members of the public will access." Id. at 269.
A second approach would be to consider the location of the author, creator, or greatest number of creators of the website as the proper location to apply subjective territoriality. 48 However, this approach falls within the fails to answer completely the original question of location, because, like the first approach, it falls within the "simultaneous publication" dilemma. While an author may be located in a single nation, the website is made available everywhere. The website's content may be legal where it was written or entered into the Internet but illegal in one or more of the nations where it is viewed. The second approach is thus incomplete in a way similar to the first approach.
A third approach would be to apply the subjective territoriality principle based only on where the server is located, as creating a website or posting messages on the Internet requires storing-or at a minimum, transferring-the information through a central server. 49 However, Jane Ginsburg posits that this theory would not solve many of the territorial complexities with jurisdiction. 50 The notion that the location of the server can serve as location of jurisdiction may be easily circumvented. Two theoretical situations serve as examples. In today's world of increasingly mobile technology, a server might be located on a ship or some other mobile unit. 51 Alternatively, the location of the server may be circumvented by using phone lines to send information through several countries and several sub-servers, creating the additional problem of determining the primary server. Thus, the location of the server proves to be of little use in developing the subjective territoriality doctrine.
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Another approach is to consider the location where the website was first localized. A website address begins as an Internet protocol (IP) address, analogous to a street address for a house or business. An IP address can then be translated by one of several private registrars into an easy-to-use domain name, which is a 52. Moreover, the person downloading the website may have no knowledge of the location of the website. This brings to the forefront the question whether intent is needed for application of jurisdiction, which will be discussed in the section to follow. See infra Part I.B.2; see also, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 45, at 270. string of letters in the form of a keyword or mnemonic device 53 (e.g., www.boxes.com). Many domain names include a geographic suffix, called a country code top level domain (e.g., ".uk" for the United Kingdom or ".jp" for Japan). 54 Policies and regulations regarding these suffixes vary, but generally these suffixes are reserved for citizens of the countries they indicate. 55 While IP addresses or domain names do not solve the problem of territorial location completely, they may potentially provide proof of location. Therefore, nations might apply the subjective territorial doctrine based on the domain name.
Passive Web Sites vs. Interactive Web Sites: The Question of Intent in Objective Territoriality
One essential problem with the objective territoriality doctrine as applied to the Internet is the question of intent. In short, this question can be framed as the "intended or stumbled upon" quandary. For example, if a person in country A posts pictures of her collection of purple tractors on her website, can country B, which outlaws the display of purple tractors, assert jurisdiction over the person based on the claim that there was an intended effect of encouraging the viewing of purple tractors? In other words, is there a difference between passive and active use of the Internet? In this case, country B applies jurisdiction based on the alleged intent to cause harm, but the individual actor merely posted the pictures on her website, which made them available to people whose nations' laws prohibit them from viewing the pictures. A vital question, then, is whose intent controls. Does the publisher's intent to make the pictures available to everyone everywhere constitute intent to cause an effect that would allow application of jurisdiction everywhere? Or does the viewer's intent to open the webpage constitute the intent to cause an effect necessary under objective territoriality? 56 which held that a posting on the Internet purposely intended to cause harm may be enough to justify jurisdiction when there exists a reasonably strong interest in protecting the rights of a state's citizens. 57 Some commentators have recommended further that the intent requirement be extended to cover passive postings on a website that cause harm as well. 58 
Selected Cases
The cases below illustrate the complexity of tailoring existing jurisdictional rules to Internet regulation; further, they reveal the impact that such regulation may have on individual liberty.
a. CompuServe Cases
In 1997, Germany passed the German Information and Communications Services Act. 59 Among other provisions intended to restrict content of the Internet, the Act established a type of conduit liability for internet service providers (ISPs). Under the Act, ISPs had a duty to block and make unavailable materials found to be illegal under the Act. 60 The Act provided that the ISPs only had such a duty when knowledge of the illegal material existed. 61 However, failure to remove or block the material after it was discovered would result in criminal prosecution. 62 In addition, the Act called for independent monitoring of materials that might be deemed harmful to minors. On December 8, 1995, German authorities delivered to CompuServe, Inc., a U.S.-based entity with an office in Germany, a list of 280 newsgroups that the German authorities believed violated German anti-pornography laws and contained material "harmful to minors." 64 CompuServe was located within the United States and provided access through its servers located there. CompuServe argued that the software required to filter the prohibited materials was unavailable without subsequently barring U.S. citizens from the same material. 65 The matter was ultimately resolved outside of court, and to avoid criminal prosecution, CompuServe agreed to the demands of German authorities. The result of CompuServe's concession was globally blocking the prohibited newsgroups from its service, 66 thereby barring 4.3 million subscribers worldwide from access to over 200 sexually explicit discussion groups that would potentially violate German laws. In the case before the Paris Court, LICRA and L'Union successfully argued (1) that France had jurisdiction over the Yahoo! actions on the Internet, and (2) that by making Nazi paraphernalia available on the Internet, and directing the auction to French citizens through the use of a French subsidiary, Yahoo! violated the ban on the sale of such material. 71 Yahoo! countered that it was unable accurately to ascertain the geographic location of Yahoo! Users, and therefore, that France lacked jurisdiction. The Paris Court held that France could rightfully prohibit Yahoo!'s ability to post the materials based on French law and the morals and sensibilities of "democratic states."
72 As a result, the Paris Court ordered Yahoo! to prevent French citizens from accessing illegal material, including web pages on Yahoo.com (an American website) that contained "text, extracts or quotations from Mein Kampf and Protocol of the Elders of Zion." 73 In addition, the Paris Court ordered Yahoo! to post a warning on Yahoo.fr to French citizens stating that any search for illegal Nazi paraphernalia might subject the citizen to criminal prosecution. 74 family, the French court ordered that all the copies of this book be removed from shelves throughout the country. 84 The owner of the Internet café was able to copy the book and place it on the Internet before all books were forced to be returned. 85 When threatened with legal action by the Mitterrand family, the owner responded that he would delete the files from his server and transfer them to a server in the United States. 86 Apparently, the owner did eventually send the files to the United States and several websites carry the book in digital form. However, the website that tends to be listed first by search engines has been replaced with a statement that the website has been closed due to potential legal action.
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II. Protecting Liberty on the Internet: The Need to Define Cyberliberty and Its Limitations
For nearly a decade, legal scholarship has focused on rationalizing and justifying jurisdictional schemes to control the Internet.
88 While attempting to control the spread of unpopular political expression, pornography, e-commerce, 89 and, most recently, terrorism on the World Wide Web, states have failed to recognize one of the important philosophical cornerstones of this new postWestphalian dimension. 90 In the hurried actions of states to gain control of a space without a defined territory, they have attempted the impossible: to control 84 90. When referring to the physical boundaries of the Internet, I am referring to the servers, computer hardware, software, and such other materials as the fiber optic cables.
the Internet through the application of domestic laws without regard to the global nature of the Internet. As Professor Lessig poignantly states, "We are at a critical time in the history of cyberspace. The space is changing before we have learned what was special about the place."
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At this critical time, as we are confronted with the unique challenges of regulating activity on the Internet, it is important that we reexamine the philosophical foundations of liberty, in order to avoid creating legal regimes that unduly impair Internet activity. The massive body of scholarship covering jurisdiction over the Internet has neglected to consider the basic philosophical underpinning of this global force. Some commentators' cursory remarks to the idea of "netizens" hint at a deeper matter, 92 but little is mentioned of the unbridled freedom of the early years of the Internet. While some remember the early days of the Internet as anarchic times when the evil of pornography was freely dispersed, 93 others recognize something more profound. Because activity on the Internet raises unique issues about the value of free speech, privacy, and property, it invokes discussions of liberty begun long before the Internet or computers were ever created.
Contemporary philosophers have not discussed this notion of liberty in the context of Internet activity. Several commentators and groups on the Internet have discussed the term "cyberliberty" but never defined it. In order properly to define "cyberliberty," the basic philosophic underpinning of liberty must be examined in light of contemporary problems. Once we have done this, we can create an informed definition of "cyberliberty" that will guide regulation of activity on the Internet in a way that properly balances individual rights against the regulatory power of nations.
A. Philosophical Foundations of Liberty
For generations, philosophers have debated the definition, merits, and boundaries of liberty. The thoughts of three notable philosophers stand out: Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and John Stewart Mill. Hobbes, Locke, and Mill all agree on the fundamental principle that liberty is inherent in a state of nature. Beyond its mere existence, however, the three define liberty differently. In Leviathan, Hobbes defined liberty as "the absence of external impediments, which impediments may oft take away part of a man's power to do what he would, but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgment and reason shall dictate to him." 94 To Hobbes, liberty is not complete freedom, but rather the ability to do that which an individual has the "will, desire, or inclination to do." 95 Similarly, Lockean theory holds liberty to be the natural right to accommodate one's individual tastes to the extent that liberty of others is not impeded. 96 While similar to Hobbes and Locke in some ways, Mill describes liberty as the absolute right of an individual to be sovereign over her own mind and body. Further, Mill provides a three-pronged definition of liberty. First, liberty is the freedom of thought, conscience, and the ability to express opinions on all subjects. 97 Second, liberty presents the ability to formulate and follow individual tastes and preferences even to the extent to which the individual may suffer unfavorable consequences. 98 Third, liberty is the freedom to unite to protect these opinions, tastes, or for general protection, even at the sake of liberty itself.
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While all three authors define liberty as a method for fulfilling one's preferences, Hobbes and Locke differ slightly with Mill as to the reason liberty is important. Hobbes argues that in nature, liberty lies in the war of all against all. "For as amongst master-less men, there is perpetual war of every man against his neighbor." 100 An individual has complete freedom and can do that which is most conducive to his desires. 101 But even this is not complete liberty. An individual in a war of all against all can only do what can be successfully completed without losing the battle to another. Individuals exchange natural liberty for civil laws and the rule of a sovereign, because security in property and protection can be found only within these two constraints.
102 Within the confines established by government, individuals find true liberty.
Locke agrees with Hobbes that societies are formed out of a desire for protection. Locke states that "there is only political society where every one of the members has given up his natural power, surrendered it into the hands of the community." 103 A political society will provide protection against the war of all against all. Therefore, some measure of liberty must be forgone for the sake of peace and comfort. This in turn protects the liberty to live in this peace and comfort.
The importance of liberty to Mill has a more humanistic characteristic than to Hobbes and Locke. Following his three-pronged approach, Mill first holds that to prohibit freedom of thought, conscience, and expression in their entirety causes both harm to the essence of the individual and humanity as a whole because quieted ideas may have value and solutions for all.
104 Second, the ability to formulate and follow individual tastes and preferences is necessary for the human to grow and exist, because growth and existence can only occur through making choices. 105 Finally, while the individual may unite with others as a form of protection, the individual maintains a sense of individuality by not being accountable for actions that concern no one but herself. 106 Only when the individual's exercise of liberty causes harm to others may it be limited. This is true for all forms of government.
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Despite their differences in definition and emphasis, Hobbes, Locke, and Mill all place similar boundaries on liberty. While all agree that liberty extends only so far as the sovereign and society permit, they also assert that collective control of the individual may only be exercised in furtherance of self-preservation. "That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." 108 The primary problem with liberty lies in where to find a "fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control," that is, avoiding the tyranny of the majority.
B. Contemporary Theories of Cyberliberty, and Implications for Expression, Privacy, and Intellectual Property
Fearful of the increasing attempts by countries to exercise jurisdiction over the Internet, Grateful Dead writer John Perry Barlow posted on the Internet "A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace." It stated, Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of the Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.
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A search of the Library of Congress catalog will reveal no titles or books listed under the term "cyberliberty."
111 Similarly, a search of the Lexis system locates only seven entries, only one of which explicitly uses the word cyberliberty. 112 In that article, Steven R. Salbu defines cyberliberty as a means to aid democracy by enabling free speech. 113 Although various sources on the Internet use the term "cyberliberty" or "cyberliberties" in different ways 113.
"Cyberliberty" is another benefit of the Internet. It embodies democratic ideals through the Internet's facilitation of openness and speech as values embraced in the First Amendment. For example, making governmental publications widely available for downloading can strengthen our democratic system by improving access to original documents, thereby offering an alternative to filtered information offered by the press. Likewise, the Internet can enhance democracy by enabling "cheap speech," liberating the "marketplace of ideas" from the institutional dominance of publishers, distributors, broadcast media, and other traditional gate-keepers of speech. generally considered a matter of free expression. However, cyberliberty encompasses concerns about privacy and intellectual property as well.
Cyberliberty and Free Expression
Cyberliberty is generally considered, at least by those on the Internet, to be a particular application of free speech rights. Ian Clark, the creator of the revolutionary FreeNet program, which provides uncensorable dissemination of controversial information and universal personal publication through a computer-to-computer network, implicitly defines cyberliberty as the protector of the free flow of information. His definition of cyberliberty revolves around the basic precept that freedom of speech is "generally considered one of the most important rights any individual might have."
115 In Clark's view, freedom of expression is important for three reasons. First, communication defines humanity. 116 The ability to communicate complex and abstract concepts separates humans from animals. Second, "knowledge is good."
117 Greater amounts of information improve an individual or group's ability to survive and be successful. Third, democratic governments require a well-informed populace.
118 This is a form of republican theory that holds that government should cultivate in citizens "qualities of character necessary to the common good of selfgovernment."
119 Clark concludes that government should not be able to control its population's ability to distribute information because of the importance of this ability to the overall freedom of the individual.
General consensus too appears to support a conception of cyberliberty predominantly as the right to free expression on the Internet. tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as a basis for this theory. 120 In no place, however, is this contemporary understanding more apparent than in the United States. For example, civil liberties groups have successfully challenged the Communications Decency Act (CDA), which intended to limit access to pornography by minors, and have sued library officials who have restricted access to such Internet content. 121 In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court effectively held the CDA unconstitutional based on First and Fifth Amendment concerns. 122 
Cyberliberty and Privacy
Other advocates of Internet liberty, such as the Global Internet Liberty Campaign (GILC), extend cyberliberty beyond protection of free speech to protection against invasion of privacy. GILC argues that cyberliberty covers four areas beyond free speech. 123 First, it advocates freedom from over-regulation of technologies related to Internet transmissions. 124 Next, GILC strives to ensure that personal information generated for one purpose is not used for alternative purposes. 125 Further, it argues for protecting private information and preventing restrictions on encryption. 126 Finally, GILC advocates the right to anonymity online to ward off potential violations of human rights and to remove fears of retribution. 127 
Cyberliberty and Intellectual Property
In general, intellectual property law recognizes property rights in the intangible products created by the human mind. Influential legal scholars of Internet and government regulation focus on the Internet as a necessary medium to encourage this type of creativity. 128 While some may argue that this is nothing more than a free speech issue, the Internet as a creative medium presents a distinguishable regulatory dilemma.
Never before has there been a medium that allows us to try out different "and even heretical" ideas free of socioeconomic conditions, and receive feedback to our creativity immediately from all corners of the world. 129 While there is little doubt that Gutenberg's printing press fundamentally changed education and public discourse, the Internet is unparalleled in its ability to do all of this more efficiently, more economically, free of ordinary politics, and "free to develop, to work ideas out, without apology." 130 The very nature and structure of the Internet makes this medium extraordinarily capable of infusing creativity into a global society. The creativity occurring in this medium and the ability to use the Internet as a means of transferring creative works gives rise to an important regulatory interest of all governments: protecting intellectual property rights (IP rights).
While IP rights have been examined extensively in the literature, several recent events are worth mentioning. First, some deem the Internet to be the death of copyright. Ginsburg notes some of the problems with enforcing copyrights:
Should one look to the country where copies were (first) received? To the country from which the author uploaded the work? To the country in which is localized the website from which the work first becomes available to the public? What are the consequences of these different characterizations of publication and country of origin? 131 While the Internet can be used to infringe or even rob copyright owners of the benefits of copyright, the Internet has also been used to prevent the grant of Now, as nations attempt to regulate the Internet, it is important to retain much of the original integrity of the Internet and its ideals with cyberliberty. Mill's theory of the importance of liberty justifies the maintenance of cyberliberty. Cyberliberty protects free expression because prohibiting it would harm the essence of the individual and humanity as a whole. Also, the ability to formulate creative ideas and express one's preferences enables humans to grow and flourish. Finally, liberty on the Internet ensures a forum wherein disenfranchised actors can have a voice in globalization.
Except Constraints Imposed by the State of Which an Individual or Entity Is a National
Cyberliberty is not without limits. The individual must sacrifice some measure of natural liberty for the protection and security afforded by governance. 134 In today's world, all territories have been divided into a system of nation-states. Sovereignty is and always has been the very backbone of this modern state system.
In his seminal work, A Modern Law of Nations, Philip C. Jessup defined classic sovereignty as the "ultimate freedom of national will unrestricted by law." 135 States are the ultimate source of rights, duties, and liberties under international law. Sovereign independence permits individual societies to affirm and develop their own values. The cost of societal regulations for communities and individuals must be determined by their own governments. Extranational regulations affect sovereignty by making it impossible for communities to establish independent identities.
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To allow one nation or all nations to regulate foreign citizens or activities within other nations violates sovereignty, except, as stated in Part I, when there is a basis for regulation, such as an effect in the second jurisdiction. 137 As one commentator stated, "The plurality of norms, ideas, customs, and politics within the Internet community itself escapes regulation by a single entity or acquiescence to a single jurisdiction." 138 Therefore, constraints on cyberliberty may only be applied by states to members of their own community.
Regarding prescriptive jurisdiction, the above definition of cyberliberty is consistent with the nationality principle, but inconsistent with the objective territoriality principle. I would argue, rather, that the objective territoriality principle is inconsistent with cyberliberty. As Hobbes stated, natural liberty is the war of all against all. An individual chooses to give up some of his liberty in order to have protection from such strife. However, this liberty is only given to a specific sovereign, and the individual is only bound by a sovereign when he or she covenants with consent. Hobbes states, "Man in absolute liberty cannot be expected to recognize two opposing representatives of individual authority." 139 Furthermore, man can only be a citizen under one sovereign. A competing sovereign places all men in a state of war, the very thing man gives up absolute liberty to avoid. 140 Objective territoriality allows a sovereign to which an individual has not given up power to exercise laws to the detriment of the individual's liberty. This sovereign grants no protection in exchange for liberty, and the individual cannot choose to disobey its commands. The individual is bound without consent and therefore completely loses liberty. Under a proper sovereign, an individual only loses a portion of liberty, not all liberty. At the very minimum, the individual who consents still has the freedom to chose to remain under the sovereign or leave.
D. The Definition of Cyberliberty Applied
Unfortunately for both Yahoo! and CompuServe, the new definition of cyberliberty would not free these corporations from the jurisdiction of France or Germany. Both companies had subsidiaries located within and under the law of the host state. In both cases, these subsidiaries would have been entities falling within national regulation, although the parent companies would not.
This does not mean, however, that all individuals would suffer the fate of Yahoo! and CompuServe. The new definition of cyberliberty would free nonFrench and non-German individuals from the constraints of both French and
